INTRODUCTION
Are state courts' analyses of child pornography statutes unconstitutional? Consider the following hypotheticals: Jay, an eighteen-year-old boy and Kay, his eighteen-year old girlfriend are sexually active. During sexual intercourse, the boy takes pictures of the sexual encounter with the camera on his phone. Upon the girl's request, the boy then sends the pictures to his girlfriend's phone. Kay's mother then stumbles upon the images on her daughter's phone. Angered, Kay's mother informs the local police precinct of the images. Since the sex is consensual, the police would most likely inform the mother that there are no criminal charges to bring against the boyfriend. Changing the scenario slightly, assume all the above facts are the same, except Kay is seventeen-years-old instead of eighteen. Under many jurisdictions, 1 Jay could be charged with not only possession of child pornography, but distribution as well. Additionally, Kay could be charged with the possession and/or production of child pornography, even though she is a minor. 2 The Supreme Court made it clear that a state's interest in "'safeguarding the physical and psychological well being of a minor' is 'compelling.'" 3 However, prosecuting Jay and/or Kay, arguably, does not safeguard the physical and psychological well being of a minor. While there has been a great deal of material dedicated to the constitutionality of teen sexting, 4 the question that remains is whether depictions of legal sexual conduct should fit the definition of child pornography?
As discussed in the 2010 case, U.S. v. Stevens, child pornography can arguably fall within the unprotected category of "speech integral to criminal conduct." 5 Can depictions of legal sexual conduct with an individual under the statutory age in child pornography statutes be considered speech integral to the sexual abuse of children? Though the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this question, they potentially could answer the question if certiorari is granted in the Illinois case, People v. Hollins. 6 In Part I, this comment will examine a survey of jurisdictions to determine where a depiction of legal sexual conduct could be defined as child pornography. Part II will review the history of Supreme Court cases discussing child pornography to determine how the Court held on the constitutionality of child pornography statutes. Part III discusses how People v. Hollins could answer the aforementioned question. Part IV deliberates potential solutions to solve the legal loophole that exists.
PART I: SURVEY OF STATE STATUTES
The aforementioned legal loophole 7 is contingent on the correlation between a state's legal age of consent and child pornography statutes. In order for an individual to be prosecuted under child pornography statutes for the depiction of legal sexual intercourse, the jurisdiction's age requirement for child pornography must be higher than the legal age for consent to sexual intercourse. 8 Conversely, if a jurisdiction's legal age of consent were equal to the benchmark age in its child pornography statute, there would not be a time gap in which photographed legal sexual intercourse could violate child pornography statutes. This comment will now explore in which jurisdictions this legal age loophole exists.
Jurisdictions are split on what age an individual filmed in a sexually explicit manner must be to constitute child pornography.
The vast majority of states make it illegal to possess material that depicts a child under the age of eighteen performing in sexual representations. 9 § 14-190.13 (16) (17) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual contact with a victim who is thirteen (13) through fifteen (15) years of age, and the victim is at least four (4) years younger than the actor.").
14 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(e) (2010) ("Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if . . . the victim is at least fifteen years of age but less than seventeen years of age . . (18) In Ferber, the Court determined the constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited persons "from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of 16 by distributing material that depicts such performances." 20 The issue arose when Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a bookstore specializing in sexually oriented products, sold two films to an undercover 17 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (holding that child pornography as a category of material is outside the protection of the First Amendment); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include lewd and obscene . . . .") (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
18 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) ("The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."). People v. Ferber, 422 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1981) . The New York court held that the statute was "strikingly underinclusive", since it discriminated against visual portrayals of children engaged in sexual activity by not also prohibiting the distribution of materials of other dangerous activity. Id. at 526. The court also held the statute to be overbroad because is banned the distribution of materials produced outside the State, as well as materials which deal "with adolescent sex in a realistic but nonobscene manner." Id.
26 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982 The Free Speech Coalition argued that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions found in the statute were overbroad and vague, deterring them from producing works protected by the First Amendment. 41 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's summary judgment in favor of the Government, holding that Child Pornography Prevention Act was substantially overbroad because it banned materials that were neither obscene nor produced by the exploitation of real children. 42 In Ashcroft, the Government, citing Ferber and Osborne, argued Congress had an interest in stamping out images that are the product of child sexual abuse. 43 The Court found this unconvincing since the speech prohibited by the Child Pornography Prevention Act "records no crime and creates no victims by its production." 44 The Government next asserted that the images could lead to actual instances of child abuse. 45 Unconvinced, the Court held the causal link between virtual child pornography and actual instances of child abuse were "contingent and indirect." 46 The Court found the Government's argument 40 Id. at 241-42. Section 2256(8)(B) prohibited "[a]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture . . . that is or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." Id. at 241. Section 2256(8)(D) defined child pornography to include "sexually explicit image that was 'advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression' it depicts 'a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id at 242. According to Black's Law Dictionary, Virtual Child Pornography is defined as, " [m] aterial that includes a computer-generated image that appears to be a minor engaged in sexual activity but that in reality does not involve a person under the age of 18." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (9th ed. 2009). It should be pointed out that child pornography was not included on this list.
Arguably, this language was mere dicta, and the exclusion of child pornography from the list is not a binding decision. However, it has been argued that this exclusion has greater significance than mere dicta. 69 Before Stevens, the categories considered to be unprotected by the First Amendment included: incitement, 65 Id. The Court points out that in Ferber, the State of New York had a compelling interest in protecting children from abuse, and the value of using children in these works was nominal. Id. (citing Ferber, 762 fighting words, true threats, defamation, obscenity, child pornography, fraud, and speech integral to criminal conduct. 70 Some legal scholars believe the change in the list of unprotected forms of speech is significant, stating:
[B]efore Stevens many believed-perhaps erroneously-that any sexually explicit image of a minor was child pornography, this belief is now fatally flawed. Instead, in determining whether a particular nonobscene image constitutes child pornography, the initial question must be whether there is specific illegal conduct to which the speech is integral. 71
Based on this analysis, to be defined as child pornography, a depiction must be speech that is integral to the abuse of a child. . . a child whom defendant knew to be under the age of 18 years, while actually engaged in an act of sexual penetration with defendant . . . (2) . . . defendant knowingly photographed . . . a child whom defendant knew to be under the age of 18 years, while actually engaged in an act of sexual penetration involving the sex organs of the child . . . and (3) . . . defendant knowingly used . . . a child whom defendant knew to be under the age of 18 years, to appear in a photograph in which [child] would be depicted as actually engaging in an act of sexual penetration with defendant . . . ." Id. 78 Id. Hollins also argued that the penalty for the offense was too severe, as compared to penalties for similar offenses that contain identical elements. privacy protections than does the United States Constitution. He also argued that the statute failed to give fair notice that his conduct was criminal. 85 Second, Hollins argued that section 20.1(a), as applied, violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois constitutions. 86 Specifically, Hollins argued that he belongs to a class of people "who engage in legal sexual activities with consensual partners and choose to photograph their private interactions, thereby violating child pornography statutes that define child so as to include such otherwise legal sex partners." 87 The Illinois Supreme Court held there was "[r]ational basis for the child pornography statute under both due process and equal protection analyses . . . ." and affirmed the judgments of the Illinois appellate and circuit courts. 88
B. Supreme Court of Illinois' Analysis
In its analysis, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of the Illinois statute. 89 The State contended that the statute was rationally related to the State's "legitimate interest in protecting the psychological welfare of children." 90 Hollins countered that this interest is frustrated when the individual photographed is a seventeen year old involved in a legal consensual relationship. 91 In their discussion, the Court first looked at the Nebraska case State v. Senters. 92 Similar to Illinois, in Nebraska, an individual could "legally consent to having sexual relations", but the filming of the sexual relations was illegal. 93 In Senters, the 85 Id. at 515. Hollins also pointed to legislative history concerning the raising of the age of consent for pornography from 16 to 18 years old in 1985, arguing the reasons behind it were to aid in the prosecution of child pornography cases. -14) . Similarly to Hollins, Senters contended that the Nebraska law was not rationally related to the state's legitimate Nebraska Supreme Court held that while an individual may be old enough to legally consent to sex, they might not comprehend that the material could become public. 94 Next, the Illinois Supreme Court looked at United States v. Bach. 95 In Bach, the defendant made a similar argument to Hollins, that even though the depictions were those of a minor, according to the definition of the statute, the images should be protected because they depicted noncriminal sexual conduct. 96 The Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress's decision to define minor "as an individual under 18 was rationally related to the government's legitimate interest in enforcing child pornography laws." 97 The Illinois Supreme Court found the analysis in both Senters and Bach persuasive. 98 The Court contended that "while it is true the underlying conduct being recorded is legal, it is the actual recording of the conduct, and the consequences to the child that flow therefrom, that is the interest being protected by the statute as applied." 99 Therefore, the Court held that the Illinois statute was rationally related to the legislature's purpose to prevent harm to minors by prohibiting, not the sexual act itself, but the memorialization of that act. 100 In dissent, Justice Burke argued that the majority overlooked Stevens. 101 Justice Burke argued that the majority applied the rational basis test, since child pornography photographs are not entitled to First Amendment protection. 102 Burke pointed out that the majority's analysis that child pornography is presumed interest "because it also prohibited a person from videotaping lawful sexual conduct for private, noncommercial purposes." Id. 94 Senters, 699 N.W.2d at 817 (" [T] o remain secret, a danger exists that the recording may find its way into the public sphere, haunting the child participant for the rest of his or her life. It is reasonable to conclude that persons 16 and 17 years old, although old enough to consent to sexual relations, may not fully appreciate that today's recording of a private, intimate moment be the Internet's biggest hit next week."). The dissent in Hollins addresses the issue of why it is relevant that prosecutors are charging individuals under child pornography law for legal sexual conduct. 105 As Justice Burke argues, these photographs do not meet the definition of child pornography as defined by the Supreme Court in Stevens. 106 Therefore, material that is not child pornography is being classified as unprotected by the First Amendment.
In the Hollins dissent, Justice Burke contends that in determining whether the state's restriction on this material is constitutional, courts should apply a test more stringent than rational basis of review. 107 Classifying this material as unprotected by the First Amendment makes possible the prosecution of individuals engaged in legal sexual conduct under child pornography laws, despite the fact the material in question does not meet the definition of child pornography defined in Ferber.
103 Id. at 519. 104 Id. at 520. Burke stated, "for a photograph to be child pornography in the federal constitutional sense, and thus exempted from first amendment protection, the photograph must be 'an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.'" Id. 105 Id. (Justice Burke argues that the "photographs are therefore not child pornography as defined by the Supreme Court for purposes of the first amendment"). Further, Justice Burke argues that the majority's holding that any depiction of an individual under the age of eighteen equates to child pornography, an unprotected form of free speech, is now invalid after Stevens. 112 Citing Haynes' argument above, 113 Burke argued that in order to be defined as child pornography, the depiction must be integral to child abuse. 114 Meaning, unlike the photographs at issue in Hollins, in order to be defined as child pornography, a photograph must actually be a depiction of child abuse. 115
108 Id. at 517 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) ). 110 ) (First, the government had a compelling interest to prohibit the "sexual exploitation and abuse of children" that results form the creation of child pornography. Second, the distribution of child pornography is "intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children," because the depictions are both a permanent recording of the abuse and prohibiting the distribution of the material is an effective way of stopping the production of child pornography. Thirdly, the selling of child pornography provides an "economic motive" for and are "an integral part" of "that criminal activity." Lastly, the value in permitting child pornography was exceedingly modest).
111 Id. at 519 (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002) The counter-argument is that the depiction itself is integral to criminal conduct; the picture or videotape is the child abuse the speech is integral to. This argument is similar to the majority's justification in Hollins; 116 while there is no child abuse occurring during the legal sexual conduct, the actual filming of the sexual conduct constitutes the child abuse. An argument could be made that this justification is illogical.
If the taking of the picture itself is "child abuse," prosecutors should charge individuals under child abuse statutes. Since most prosecutors bring charges under child pornography statutes, alone, and not also under child abuse statutes, one could assume that the images would likely not constitute child abuse under state's statutes. It is illogical that images of a seventeen can been speech integral to child abuse, but the individual who captured the image is not charged under a state's specific child abuse statute.
The Supreme Court should clarify whether child pornography falls within the unprotected category of "speech integral to criminal conduct." The decision would drastically change how lower courts analyze the constitutionality of the application of child pornography statutes. As it stands, the category of speech under which child pornography falls is not clearly defined.
PART VI: HOW CAN STATES FIX THIS PROBLEM?

A. Close the Age Gap
Another solution is to close the aforementioned age gap between the legal age of consent and the age that constitutes child pornography. 117 An argument can be made that if an individual is legally old enough to consent to sex, then that individual should be able to photograph those sexual acts as well.
The counter to this argument is that even though an individual is mature enough to consent to sex, they are not necessarily old enough to comprehend the damages that could result from depictions of their sexual activities. In their analyses, 116 Hollins, 971 N.E.2d at 509 (citing State v. Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Neb. 2005) ).
117 See Supra Part I.
courts have used this justification when the constitutionality of child pornography statutes are being challenged. 118 While this argument is logical, it dodges the answer to closing the age loophole between age of consent and child pornography statutes. If courts and legislatures are worried that minors might not fully comprehend the damages that could result if these depictions became public, then they could simply raise the legal age of consent. Following some courts' logic, 119 it could be argued that if an individual is too young to comprehend the potential damages resulting from the filming of sexual explicit conduct, then they are not mature enough to legally consent to sexual conduct. As discussed by the court in Hollins, there are also potential consequences from legal sexual activity as well. 120 If courts and legislatures are worried about the potential damages resulting from depictions of sexual conduct, then they should also be concerned with the consequences of sexual conduct. Therefore, the legislature, by raising the legal age of consent, could set an age at which an individual is mature enough to both understand the damages that could result from both sexual conduct and filming of sexual conduct.
The Court's analysis in Hollins is not logical. It does not make sense that the court would hold that an individual is old enough to comprehend possible pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and emotional damages, but they are not old enough to comprehend the potential harm of recording the sexual conduct. Though debatable, it would appear that possible pregnancy would 118 See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2007 ) ("Minors who are involved in a sexual relationship, unlike adults who may be involved in a mature committed relationship, have no reasonable expectation that their relationship will continue and that the photographs will not be shared with others intentionally or unintentionally"); Senters, 699 N.W.2d at 817 ("It is reasonable to conclude that persons 16 or 17 years old, although old enough to consent to sexual relations, may not fully appreciate that today's recording of a private, intimate moment may be the Internet's biggest hit next week"); Hollins, 971 N.E.2d at 514 ("[A] 17-year-old may legally consent to sexual activity, he or she may still be unable to appreciate the subtle dangers of memorializing such activity on film or in a photograph."). As discussed above, the Court in Ferber established that there is a compelling state interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor." 125 Further, the Court pointed out that the distribution of child pornography was intrinsically related to the sexual abuse, since the depiction creates a "permanent record of the child participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation." 126 In Ashcroft, the Court distinguished virtual child pornography from the material at issue in Ferber, since virtual child pornography did not depict the abuse of a real child, and therefore was not an unprotected form of free speech. 127 This comment argues that courts are not justified in their analysis that the chance that depictions of legal sexual conduct could find their way into the public is a compelling enough state interest to penalize the mere production of these materials. . Penalizing the possession of material based on the chance the material could find its way into the public does not seem to be inline with Supreme Court precedent. 128 If courts and legislatures are concerned with the harms that could follow if these depictions are publicized, then they should penalize individuals who make the material public.
The counterargument to penalizing only the distribution of these materials is that the Supreme Court in Osborne already established that states have a compelling state interest to prohibit the mere possession of child pornography. 129 But, as discussed above, 130 the depictions at issue, arguably, do not meet the Ferber definition of child pornography, since no children were actually abused in their production.
There is no denying that harms could result from depictions of sexually explicit conduct becoming public. However, to penalize individuals under child pornography statutes on the chance they could be made public seems excessive, especially when the material at issue does not even meet the Supreme Court's definition of child pornography. There are two ways legislatures could still penalize the distribution of depictions of minors engaged in legal sexual conduct.
First, since these depictions do not meet the Ferber definition of child pornography, the distribution of these materials could be prohibited if it meets the Miller obscenity test. 131 distributed, but not the mere possession of them. Regardless of which approach legislatures choose, if courts are concerned that depictions of minors engaged in legal sexual conduct could potentially harm the minor's well being, then statutes should aim at punishing the distribution of these products, not the chance that they are released into public realms.
CONCLUSION
Referring to the second hypothetical discussed above, 132 should Jay and Kay be subjected to prosecution under their jurisdiction's child pornography statutes? While there is not Supreme Court precedent that directly addresses the issue, based on the Court's holding in Stevens, Jay and Kay's filming of their sexual conduct may not meet the definition of child pornography that was at issue in Ferber. 133 This is a question for the Supreme Court.
By establishing a threshold age for both a jurisdiction's age of consent and the age at which an individual's sexually explicit image constitutes child pornography would close the loophole that allows Jay and Kay's depictions of legal sexual activity to violate child pornography statutes. It is difficult to rationalize that while Kay (seventeen years old) is old enough to legally consent to sex, it is illegal for her to film the sexual conduct.
Further, Jay and Kay should not be prosecuted under child pornography statutes for the mere possession of depictions of their legal sexual activity, but could be held criminally liable for the distribution of those materials. Courts have established that states have a compelling interest in protecting the well being of children, and the mere existence of the material could lead to future embarrassment to the child depicted. 134 However, it would be too broad to prosecute Jay and Kay under child pornography statues for mere possession of depictions of legal sexual conduct on the mere chance that this material might find its way into the public realm. It would make more sense that there is a distribution requirement to prosecute Jay and Kay, since there is no evidence that they intend to profit from their depictions.
Regardless of whether you agree with Jay and Kay's decision to film their sexual conduct, neither of their actions meet the definition of child pornography the Court addressed in Ferber, nor is their conduct in the category of conduct that child pornography statutes are aimed at preventing. The depictions of their legal sexual activity should be protected under their right to free speech provided by the First Amendment.
